Concept for Parkers Crossroads - Mini-Campaign
Posted: Sat 25 Jan 2014 2:54 pm
Hey Guys,
In order to give myself a more manageable campaign to devise and learn with , I have come up with this. I hope it appeals to some of you with a willingness to play while I am learning...
Parkers Crossroads - A Template for an SEOW Mini-Campaign
This is my first campaign design for SEOW. There are likely to be bugs , glitches and design errors. I hope you will bear with them and return to me with feedback so that I might improve at the next attempt.
The Historical Situation
On Dec 16 , 1944 , the Germans unleashed "Wacht am Rhein" , the audacious attempt to cut through the mountainous Ardennes region of Belgium and Luxembourg with the strategic goal (in Hitler's mind) of reaching Antwerp , and thus separating Montgomery's 21st Army Group in the north from Bradley's 1st Army Group in the south.
Few German Staff officers believed Hitler's aims were achieveable , but fewer were willing to criticize the Fuehrer's plan. The Luftwaffe was ordered to carry out a major complementary air strike with all fighters and jabos available on the Western Front - code named Unternehmen Bodenplatte (Baseplate) - attacking all the Allied forward airfields in France , Holland , and Belgium. Slow accumulation of resources and poor weather delayed the contribution of Bodenplatte until Jan 1 , 1945 , by which time the outcome of the "Battle of the Bulge" , or the "Von Rundstedt Offensive" , had already failed ( though weeks of hard fighting and the supplementary attack called "Nordwind" launched in Alsace-Lorraine on the same date meant it would be February before the German bulge had been eradicated.
Despite catching the entire Allied command with its pants down , Wacht am Rhein was ultimately denied by repeated incidents of small American units at foggy and snowy hamlets delaying the Germans again and again , with a cumulative effect enough to blunt the offensive , and to allow the Allies to bring their superior numbers and excellent logistics to bear. The failure of Bodenplatte on New Years day , though costly for both sides , was the true death blow to the Luftwaffe , as many of its finest and most experienced leaders either died or were injured or taken prisoner in one fell swoop.
This Mini-Campaign for SEOW is based on the struggle of one of those small groups of American soldiers, whose hold on one isolated but critical crossroads, had an effect far beyond the scale of the forces involved on the overall battle.
On Dec. 16 , 1944 , Major Arthur C. Parker was the commanding officer of Battery A of the 589th Field Artillery Btn , part of the inexperienced US 106th Golden Lions Infantry Division , assigned to become "combat acclimatized" in the quiet Ardennes sector. The 106th was deployed on and about the Elsenborn ridge , a north-south hill feature just west of the German border.
When the German assault began early on Dec. 16 , the green fighting men of the 106th were directly in the path of the onslaught , and predictably showed every possible response to the overwhelming force. Many died. Many fled. Many were captured. A few combat groups under determined leaders stood and fought. A few others risked the rath of higher brass by taking matters into their own hands and directing a retreat. Few had a grasp of the scale of events.
Parker was one of the latter. With a few attached infantrymen of the 106th , he directed his battery of 105mm howitzers westwards , without a clear idea of a long term plan.
Historians argue as to whether Parker himself recognized the crossroads at Baraque de Fraiture for the operationally significant feature it was , or whether he was ordered from above to stand and hold there. Regardless of the reason , Parker ordered his small band to dig in and hold back the Germans.
And hold they did. From Dec. 17 through to the 23rd , Parker and his men , augmented by stragglers from various units pressed to join the men at the crossroads , and also by small groups of reinforcements from higher formations in the vicinity, held against multiple attacks form all points of the compass until Dec. 23.
By December 23rd , the entire German attack was in deep trouble. Poor road structure , shortages of fuel , and the stubbornness of American troops were frustrating the assault everywhere. And on December 23rd the weather cleared , releasing the power of Allied tactical air support to influence the battlefield.
The Germans had been frustrated in all their attempts to secure Bastogne and its key road hubs. Forced to find alternate paths had led them to pursue the secondary roads that passed through Baraque de Fraiture , a few miles northof Bastogne . Over the last few days elements of 2nd Panzer Division had failed to take the crossroads , and had quickly (and wisely) determined to try other routes ( 2nd Panzer Divison ultimately made it further west than any other German formation) ; for the last two days , the 560th VolksGrenadier Division had tried attacks from several directions. On Decmeber 23rd , the job fell to the men of 2ndSS Panzer Division Das Reich , under the command of the Regimental CO of the 4thSS Panzer Grenadier Regiment "Der Fuehrer" , SS OberSturmbannfuehrer Otto Weidinger. Weidinger , a good Nazi , quickly assessed the situation according to the means at hand , and ordered an attack.
December 23, 1944 Baraque de Fraiture , Belgium
Baraque de Fraiture sits about halfway north to south between Malmedy in the north , and Bastogne in the south. It is on the east-west road between St. Vith and Marche en Famenne , both key road interchanges in the difficult Belgian terrain.
Campaign Design Concepts
This campaign will be unique in several respects , partly to represent the conditions specific to this action , and partly to experiment with a couple of new wrinkles to campaign play.
The Campaign will be played out in 8 Turns of one hour realtime , 1000-1800hrs Dec.23 1944.
There will be no movement truncations , and no clock advances.
The ground action for this battle occurred at a tactical level and over a relatively small area of terrain , but higher formations , including air forces, had an effect. In order to represent this , only those forces in action around Baraque de Fraiture will be under the command of Player/Commanders. Other ground units will be on the map , but will be under the control of the administrator. Essentially this means these units will not move (player/commanders will determine their positions) , but will defend their positions.
Airfields and cities outside of the tactical area will be in play , but only insofar as they affect air units and supply units allocated to the tactical battle area. Players can command any/all air units on the map.
Air missions may be plotted anywhere on the map.
Radar units will be placed by player/commanders within a limited area of deployment , for example ; "within 10km of Creil".
Only supply vehicles with a destination in the battle area may be commanded by player/commanders.
AA/FlaK units will be placed by player/comanders within a limtied area of deployment , for example ;
"in or between Reims-Soissons" .
Beacons and Radio Transmitter objects may be placed by player/commanders prior to play within a limited area of deployment.
These units are not subject to movement or control of the player/commander in any way after initial setup.
There are a couple of key operational areas on the map that will affect the campaign , but are out of the command jurisdiction of the player/commanders :
Malmedy
By Decmeber 23rd , KG Peiper (the spearhead of 1stSS Panzer Division LSSAH , and the point unit of 6th Panzer Armee) had had its swansong , and had retreated from its point of furthest penetration (Stoumont-Stavelot-La Gleize) to the area around Malmedy. The Germans will have units around this area ( from ISS Panzer Korps) which the Axis player/commanders may place initially before the campaign begins, but will not command during the battle.
Bastogne
The Americans held beseiged Bastogne with multiple units , but at this time all these units were in a defensive disposition and mindset. The units represented in the Bastogne area may be placed by the Allied player/commanders before the campaign begins , but they will not be able to command them during the battle.
There will be no droppable paratroop forces available to either side.
There will be limited supply drops available to both sides. (exact number to be determined)
Only the Allies may make propoganda drops. (exact number to be determined)
There will be no spies available to either side.
Neither side will know the enemy unit/equipment disposition.
Both sides will receive briefings which will contain valid information , but may not be 100% accurate.
This is to reflect the poor reconnaissance conditions affecting both sides due to the weather and the confusion of the first week of the attack.
Neither side will receive combat statistics after each mission , making it necessary for each side to get together after each mission to debrief and piece together their best impression of current dispositions.
It is my hope that this will raise the importance of having human pilots man dangerous and very important recon flights
That is the concept to date.
Suggestions are always welcome , regardless of whether they are acted upon.
OOBs will follow.
Sincerely ,
Kopfdorfer.
In order to give myself a more manageable campaign to devise and learn with , I have come up with this. I hope it appeals to some of you with a willingness to play while I am learning...
Parkers Crossroads - A Template for an SEOW Mini-Campaign
This is my first campaign design for SEOW. There are likely to be bugs , glitches and design errors. I hope you will bear with them and return to me with feedback so that I might improve at the next attempt.
The Historical Situation
On Dec 16 , 1944 , the Germans unleashed "Wacht am Rhein" , the audacious attempt to cut through the mountainous Ardennes region of Belgium and Luxembourg with the strategic goal (in Hitler's mind) of reaching Antwerp , and thus separating Montgomery's 21st Army Group in the north from Bradley's 1st Army Group in the south.
Few German Staff officers believed Hitler's aims were achieveable , but fewer were willing to criticize the Fuehrer's plan. The Luftwaffe was ordered to carry out a major complementary air strike with all fighters and jabos available on the Western Front - code named Unternehmen Bodenplatte (Baseplate) - attacking all the Allied forward airfields in France , Holland , and Belgium. Slow accumulation of resources and poor weather delayed the contribution of Bodenplatte until Jan 1 , 1945 , by which time the outcome of the "Battle of the Bulge" , or the "Von Rundstedt Offensive" , had already failed ( though weeks of hard fighting and the supplementary attack called "Nordwind" launched in Alsace-Lorraine on the same date meant it would be February before the German bulge had been eradicated.
Despite catching the entire Allied command with its pants down , Wacht am Rhein was ultimately denied by repeated incidents of small American units at foggy and snowy hamlets delaying the Germans again and again , with a cumulative effect enough to blunt the offensive , and to allow the Allies to bring their superior numbers and excellent logistics to bear. The failure of Bodenplatte on New Years day , though costly for both sides , was the true death blow to the Luftwaffe , as many of its finest and most experienced leaders either died or were injured or taken prisoner in one fell swoop.
This Mini-Campaign for SEOW is based on the struggle of one of those small groups of American soldiers, whose hold on one isolated but critical crossroads, had an effect far beyond the scale of the forces involved on the overall battle.
On Dec. 16 , 1944 , Major Arthur C. Parker was the commanding officer of Battery A of the 589th Field Artillery Btn , part of the inexperienced US 106th Golden Lions Infantry Division , assigned to become "combat acclimatized" in the quiet Ardennes sector. The 106th was deployed on and about the Elsenborn ridge , a north-south hill feature just west of the German border.
When the German assault began early on Dec. 16 , the green fighting men of the 106th were directly in the path of the onslaught , and predictably showed every possible response to the overwhelming force. Many died. Many fled. Many were captured. A few combat groups under determined leaders stood and fought. A few others risked the rath of higher brass by taking matters into their own hands and directing a retreat. Few had a grasp of the scale of events.
Parker was one of the latter. With a few attached infantrymen of the 106th , he directed his battery of 105mm howitzers westwards , without a clear idea of a long term plan.
Historians argue as to whether Parker himself recognized the crossroads at Baraque de Fraiture for the operationally significant feature it was , or whether he was ordered from above to stand and hold there. Regardless of the reason , Parker ordered his small band to dig in and hold back the Germans.
And hold they did. From Dec. 17 through to the 23rd , Parker and his men , augmented by stragglers from various units pressed to join the men at the crossroads , and also by small groups of reinforcements from higher formations in the vicinity, held against multiple attacks form all points of the compass until Dec. 23.
By December 23rd , the entire German attack was in deep trouble. Poor road structure , shortages of fuel , and the stubbornness of American troops were frustrating the assault everywhere. And on December 23rd the weather cleared , releasing the power of Allied tactical air support to influence the battlefield.
The Germans had been frustrated in all their attempts to secure Bastogne and its key road hubs. Forced to find alternate paths had led them to pursue the secondary roads that passed through Baraque de Fraiture , a few miles northof Bastogne . Over the last few days elements of 2nd Panzer Division had failed to take the crossroads , and had quickly (and wisely) determined to try other routes ( 2nd Panzer Divison ultimately made it further west than any other German formation) ; for the last two days , the 560th VolksGrenadier Division had tried attacks from several directions. On Decmeber 23rd , the job fell to the men of 2ndSS Panzer Division Das Reich , under the command of the Regimental CO of the 4thSS Panzer Grenadier Regiment "Der Fuehrer" , SS OberSturmbannfuehrer Otto Weidinger. Weidinger , a good Nazi , quickly assessed the situation according to the means at hand , and ordered an attack.
December 23, 1944 Baraque de Fraiture , Belgium
Baraque de Fraiture sits about halfway north to south between Malmedy in the north , and Bastogne in the south. It is on the east-west road between St. Vith and Marche en Famenne , both key road interchanges in the difficult Belgian terrain.
Campaign Design Concepts
This campaign will be unique in several respects , partly to represent the conditions specific to this action , and partly to experiment with a couple of new wrinkles to campaign play.
The Campaign will be played out in 8 Turns of one hour realtime , 1000-1800hrs Dec.23 1944.
There will be no movement truncations , and no clock advances.
The ground action for this battle occurred at a tactical level and over a relatively small area of terrain , but higher formations , including air forces, had an effect. In order to represent this , only those forces in action around Baraque de Fraiture will be under the command of Player/Commanders. Other ground units will be on the map , but will be under the control of the administrator. Essentially this means these units will not move (player/commanders will determine their positions) , but will defend their positions.
Airfields and cities outside of the tactical area will be in play , but only insofar as they affect air units and supply units allocated to the tactical battle area. Players can command any/all air units on the map.
Air missions may be plotted anywhere on the map.
Radar units will be placed by player/commanders within a limited area of deployment , for example ; "within 10km of Creil".
Only supply vehicles with a destination in the battle area may be commanded by player/commanders.
AA/FlaK units will be placed by player/comanders within a limtied area of deployment , for example ;
"in or between Reims-Soissons" .
Beacons and Radio Transmitter objects may be placed by player/commanders prior to play within a limited area of deployment.
These units are not subject to movement or control of the player/commander in any way after initial setup.
There are a couple of key operational areas on the map that will affect the campaign , but are out of the command jurisdiction of the player/commanders :
Malmedy
By Decmeber 23rd , KG Peiper (the spearhead of 1stSS Panzer Division LSSAH , and the point unit of 6th Panzer Armee) had had its swansong , and had retreated from its point of furthest penetration (Stoumont-Stavelot-La Gleize) to the area around Malmedy. The Germans will have units around this area ( from ISS Panzer Korps) which the Axis player/commanders may place initially before the campaign begins, but will not command during the battle.
Bastogne
The Americans held beseiged Bastogne with multiple units , but at this time all these units were in a defensive disposition and mindset. The units represented in the Bastogne area may be placed by the Allied player/commanders before the campaign begins , but they will not be able to command them during the battle.
There will be no droppable paratroop forces available to either side.
There will be limited supply drops available to both sides. (exact number to be determined)
Only the Allies may make propoganda drops. (exact number to be determined)
There will be no spies available to either side.
Neither side will know the enemy unit/equipment disposition.
Both sides will receive briefings which will contain valid information , but may not be 100% accurate.
This is to reflect the poor reconnaissance conditions affecting both sides due to the weather and the confusion of the first week of the attack.
Neither side will receive combat statistics after each mission , making it necessary for each side to get together after each mission to debrief and piece together their best impression of current dispositions.
It is my hope that this will raise the importance of having human pilots man dangerous and very important recon flights
That is the concept to date.
Suggestions are always welcome , regardless of whether they are acted upon.
OOBs will follow.
Sincerely ,
Kopfdorfer.