seowhq.net

Hey Guys,

Despite my presence being elswewhere , my thoughts have been percolating with SEOW campaign ideas for
some time now.
Thanks to the work of AH_kawilder , I have another database to muck up.

The concept is the Japanese advance on Rangoon in the early spring of 1942.
Following the fall of Singapore , Japanese eyes turned northwest toward Rangoon and Burma.
The reason for continuing their advance out of Malaysia was two-fold.
The first , like the driving force behind their entire campaign in the region , was the acquisition of resources ,
especially raw materials.
In the case of Burma this also included large refinery complexes at Syriam (near Rangoon)
and Yenangyaung on the Irrawaddy River to the NW.
Second , the conquest of Burma would provide flank protection (from India and China)
for the continued control of Malaysia.

To the Allies , the Japanese entry into Burma was challenging in military , economic and political terms.
The British arguably had the dregs of their military strength in Burma.
Most Naval strength had withdrawn to other theatres entirely , or to the perceived relative safety of the
Indian Ocean.
The RAF had been denuded to support other theatres as well , and the remainder of aircraft included obsolete
models as well as insufficient numbers.
There was one bright light in terms of air strength , in that the AVG was in the region ( though by the time of
my campaign , only one Sqdn was within range to defend Rangoon).
There were only 2 Commonwealth Divisions available , manned primarily by Indian and Burmese Troops , and
across the spectrum of quality - mostly at the lower end.
In economic terms , Rangoon was a vast storehouse of military equipment , supplies and raw materials.
Much of the upcoming campaign was an attempt first to use , then to move , and ultimately to destroy these
before they could be turned to Japanese use.
Politically , Burma was a test of the new and tentative alliance between China and Britain from December 1941
to hold open the India - Burma - China Road.
Chiang's Nationalist Army desperately needed the Road held open to assure ongoing
supply for his troops .

My Campaign Concept

Dates : Feb 21-24 , 1942
Missions : 4-6 Missions per day tbd

Planeset :
Allies *** Japanese
Hawker Audax F (aviB534) *** Ki27 Otsu 'Nate' F
Buffalo MkI FB *** Ki44 'Tojo' F
Hurricane IIA F *** Ki15 'Babs' AC/R (Letov S-328)
Hurricane IIB FB *** Ki51 'Sonia' AC/R (Pzl23 Karas)
Hawk 81A-2 (3/AVG) F *** Ki48 'Lily' B (Beaufort MkI earely)
Blenheim IF F *** Ki21-II 'Sally' B
Blenhiem IV B *** Ki46 'Dinah' R
Hudson MkIII BR (FiatBr20) *** Ki57 'Topsy' Tr
Short Sunderland MkI BR (H8K1) *** L2D 'Tabby' Tr
Walrus MkI BR (MBR2) *** E13A 'Jake' FB float (Ar196)
DC-2 Tr (C47)
Bristol Bombay Tr/B (Potez 542)

Very Rough OOB Outline :
Allies :
17th Indian Division
1st Burma Division
Burma Frontier Force
Burma Auxilliary Force
Rangoon Defence Force
7th Armoured Brigade (RFG)
Viper Force No2 Royal Marine Commando (RFG)
Elts Chinese 5th Army

Axis :
Elts 31st Division (TypeB)
33rd Division (TypeB)
55th Division (TypeB)
2nd Tank Regt
Elts 15th Army

Naval OOB
Allies :

SS Tulsa carrying Supplies

HMS Enterprise CL (Carrying Viper Force)

Convoy JS2X Ceylon - Singapore (rerouted to Rangoon after the fall of Singapore and
Carrying 7th Armoured Bde )
5-6 Ships

Convoy JS2X Escort Force
1 x CA , 1 x DD , 1 x Sloop , 1 x Corvette

Rangoon Harbour Defence Force
Several HDMLs (Harbour Defence Motor Launches)
1 x Steam Gun Boat
1 x Harbour Sentry Boat

Frontier Force 2 Marine Element
Several Armed Junks

IJN :

4 x Submarine

12 x Daihatsu LC

Supply Ship RFGs from Singapore

That's it to start.
Build underway.
Working on viable Victory Conditions.



Kopfdorfer

Nice. Please continue to log your progress here.

Cheers,
4S

Okay .

I am calling this campaign "Road to Rangoon" , or RtR for a good short acronym.

I have a fairly precise OOB worked out which I will be holding to quite closely.

Now I need to establish good clear Objectives for both sides that reflect the historical
situation , but also allow for flexibility of command on both sides.
Some Parameters:
1) There will be no paratroop functions , other than supply drops.
2) There will be no industrial production , but there will by supply tracking.
This campaign will cover only 4 days of operations and factory production for this time
frame and region would be unrealistic.
Supply movement , however , was one of the key facets of the operation.
Rangoon was a significant supply hub with a great deal of stock stored around the city.
The Allies knew that they were likely to lose Rangoon , and that they would need much of
these supplies to carry on the fight against the Japanese Army ( neither Britain nor the
US were committed to sending reinforcements to this theatre , despite both having
political reason to want to hold the Japanese away from India and the India - China road
through Lashio).
One of the key Allied considerations will be the decision as to how many
assets should be directed to move supplies north to the line Chittagong - Mandalay , and
how many should be destroyed to prevent them from falling in to Japanese hands.
Engineers will prove significant in this regard , as will transport.
3) Amphibious loading and unloading of units and supplies will be limited to Port Control
Points , other than by Landing Craft (IJA only) , or by Junks (Allies only).
All other vessels may transfer cargo and supplies only while in port.
There will by 5 Port Control Points :
Chittagong , Akyab , Rangoon , Moulmein and Ye.
4) The Sittang and Irrawaddy Rivers may only be crossed at bridges , and at
Ferry Control Points.
(I have yet to determine how many and where Ferry Control Points should be placed).
The map is flawed in that bridges cannot be destroyed by air attack , so we will have to
live with that limitation. By having bridgesand Ferry Crossings as Control Points we can
still simulate the importance that each river crossing held in this campaign.
5) Burma had a significant rail system , and this will be reflected in the OOBs.
The Allies will have a numerical advantage in this regard.
6) The Allies will have significant RFGs approaching by sea - they will need to assess whether
to try to force their delivery into Rangoon , or to send them to a more distant but safer
port.
7) In terms of Force Ratios , the Japanese will have significant advatages in Air power , and
in ground forces.
The Allies will have significant advantage in terms of naval strength ( though this will not
be great) and in terms of transport capability - but much of the transport capability will
be tied up in moving supplies.

I am thinking that requiring a certain tonnage at Chittagong and Mandalay for the Allies is
a good objective.
Another is the preservation of important political VIPs that were centered around
Rangoon and needed evacuation.
For the Japanese , the real objectives were military points at this time - river crossings ,
and towns along the limited road net.
In addition , tonnage of Allied supplies destroyed could be an interesting objective as well.

As usual thoughts appreciated.

Kopfdorfer

Interesting.

In addition , tonnage of Allied supplies destroyed could be an interesting objective as well.

I am not sure what you mean by "tonnage". We can easily calculate tonnage of materiel (combat units/objects) destroyed but the system does not keep good track of fuel supply so it would be hard to assess fuel supply losses unless there is no fuel production at all (which I think you are intending). In that case the total amount of supply on the map on both sides will only ever decrease as time goes on, but the distribution between the sides can go up and down according to captures of installations etc.

Cheers,
4S

My intent was to reflect some of the historical circumstances unfolding.

The British were under no illusion that the Japanese would take Rangoon.
However , Rangoon was the major storage depot for the entire region , including
resources intended for both China and India , as well as Burma.
Literally hundreds of trucks and jeeps as well as weapons ( and presumably the ammunition for them) had been unloaded from ships , and sat in a "service park" on the outskirts of the city.

Rangoon was also the administrative centre for Burma , and the region.
At this time , it was a melange of military and political VIPs trying to influence the unfolding campaign from the safety of the city. (I intend to make this situation a significant part of the campaign).

The US freighter SS Tulsa was moored in Rangoon harbour , jammed full of military equipment and supplies.
These had initially been intended for the People's Republic of China , and were to be shipped by rail north.
The British , knowing the contents of SS Tulsa , and being critically short of military materiel in the region
announced they would commandeer the ship and the materiel. This caused a political turmoil , for they (the Brits) wanted to hold Burma as long as possible as a buffer wall to India , and to allow time to re-establish a new line of defence further north (with what troops and equipment was uncertain). They were also reluctant to call upon the aid of Chinese troops , ready to the north , for fear that once they got a foothold in Burma , they would be reluctant to relinquish it after the war. For the Americans , it was of key importance to placate the Chinese Republicans . In the immediate sense , they needed the Chinese to be fighting the Japanese in Asia , tying up Japanese resources that could otherwise be directed into the Pacific Campaign. In the global sense , they wanted the Chinese Republicans to maintain the upper hand over the Communists in China - after the war.
Republican Chinese interests were more immediate - they badly needed the regular supplies flowing from India to China along the Burma road running from eastern India through Mandalay and Lashio.
...So the SS Tulsa sat fat and unloaded when the Japanese moved on Burma from Singapore and Thailand.

In addition , the refinery and fuel storage depot at Syriam - across the harbour from the Port of Rangoon -
was of major significance.

At the time of our battle , the British were politically fighting for the right to unload the SS Tulsa , and were balancing the need to fight an unwinnable defensive battle in order to keep the Japanese from Rangoon as long as possible , while moving supplies and men north to establish a new defensive line.
The first line of defense was the Sittang River , but the bulk of the British force was east of the river , in contact with the advancing Japanese.

The way I envision using the VIPs is
1) To require a certain number of them to be withdrawn (how is up to the British commanders) to northern Control Points. 2) To have their being KIA , or removed from the Rangoon District* to affect the number of command choices available to
the Allies.
For instance , if General "X" is killed or leaves the Rangoon District* , the Allies suffer a reduction in the number of
available Air Flights for the remainder of the campaign.
If Colonel "Y" is killed or leaves the Rangoon District* , the Allies suffer a reduction in the number or ground unit moves
for the remainder of the campaign. Etc , etc.
Each VIP will have a slightly different effect to reflect their different roles and ranks.
* Rangoon District is a group of 3 Control Points : Port of Rangoon , City of Rangoon , and Syriam Refinery.
3) One VIP will be related to the status of the SS Tulsa - it can neither move nor unload until he reaches a certain
Control Point (I will allow it to reposition between missions , so it does not become a sitting duck for Japanese
bombers).

In terms of the Supply requirements as victory conditions , I have the locations of several historical stores depots that had been , or were being established over the time frame of our campaign , and I thought that a simple measurement of supplies at these depots ( or within the radii of certain Control Points) would be adequate to measure success or failure.

Again , any thoughts appreciated.

Kopfdorfer